BeautyBlogOpinion

Introduction by: Peter Marshall

Arguably, Estée Lauder’s troubles are now a case study in how this beauty powerhouse misread structural shifts in China and travel retail, and then moved too slowly to reset its strategy, organisation and channels. This short feature sets out the background, what the company is now scrambling to do in its reset and outlines the lessons learned for travel retail and for brands.

A boom‑era business model that broke

For a decade, Estée Lauder rode an almost perfect storm in North Asia travel retail: booming Chinese outbound tourism, the rise of Hainan as a domestic duty free paradise, and daigou‑fuelled bulk buying in Korea. The company leaned hard into this trend, over‑shipping prestige skincare and makeup into the channel on the assumption of a rapid, V‑shaped post‑Covid rebound in Chinese demand. When that recovery stalled, the model cracked.

By fiscal 2023, the group admitted its global travel retail business was down 34% organically, “solely driven” by Asia travel retail, even as EMEA and Americas travel retail were “flying”. The same headwinds continued through FY24 and FY25.  Estée Lauder posted an 8% decline in net sales to 14.3 billion dollars in FY25, with management acknowledging that a strong double‑digit decline in global travel retail – again led by Asia – was a central drag on performance.

When daigou disappears

The pivot point was the clampdown on daigou and a structural reset of duty free in Hainan and South Korea. Enforcement actions in Hainan made retail traffic and conversion “steeply negative” in parts of 2023, just as Estée Lauder was still laden with inventory and expecting a quick normalisation. In Korea, operators and regulators alike moved away from a model heavily dependent on grey‑market resellers toward more sustainable, traveller‑focused business – but Estée Lauder’s shipment and promotion strategies lagged that shift.

Senior executives described the changes as a “timing issue” and stressed their long‑term conviction in travel retail. But the numbers told a harsher story: in FY25, nearly two‑thirds of the company’s overall revenue decline was attributed to a 28% drop in duty free sales, with travel retail shrinking to roughly 15% of group business, down fourteen percentage points from its FY21 peak. What had been a crown‑jewel channel became a volatility engine.

Inventory, forecasting and a fragile P&L

The operational consequences were brutal. Over‑optimistic forecasting for Chinese demand meant too much stock shipped into Asia travel retail just as local enforcement, macro jitters and weak consumer sentiment hit spending. That forced destocking, lower replenishment orders and aggressive promotional activity, which weighed heavily on margins.

Despite gross margin expanding towards the mid‑70s as the company pushed mix and pricing, Estée Lauder’s FY25 operating margin slumped to around 8%, and the group recorded a 785 million dollar operating loss for the full year. Skincare – the highest margin category and historically the engine of travel retail growth – fell 12%, with makeup and hair also declining. This just left fragrance as the only relatively stable segment.

In short, travel retail’s problems bled directly into the P&L and exposed how dependent the portfolio had become on a narrow set of categories, geographies and selling models.

Beauty Reimagined. Late, but necessary

Only in 2025 did the company pull the emergency brake in a way that matched the scale of the challenge. Under its “Beauty Reimagined” programme, Estée Lauder is in the process of cutting 5,800–7,000 roles (up to 11% of its workforce), consolidating its regional structure, and promising up to 1.6 billion dollars in restructuring charges to unlock 800 million to 1 billion dollars in extra gross profit. Asia Pacific, including travel retail, has been split so that mainland China now reports as a separate region, acknowledging that what happens on the island of Hainan and in Korean duty free is no longer just a subset of a broader Asia story.

The company is also trying to rebalance away from an over‑reliance on travel retail by accelerating e‑commerce and direct‑to‑consumer channels. The good news is that online sales jumped 31% to a record high in FY25 as the group leaned into digital platforms and marketplaces, including expanding its presence on Amazon’s Premium Beauty storefront. Yet even here, it is still playing catch‑up with competitors that moved faster on social commerce, local Chinese platforms and data‑driven personalisation.

Estée Lauder: Plans for recovery are in place, but still vulnerable? 

Lessons for travel retail. And for brands

For the wider travel retail ecosystem, Estée Lauder’s struggles offer some very stark lessons.

First, over‑concentration is dangerous. Building your growth algorithm around a single nationality, a handful of destinations (Hainan and Seoul), and a daigou‑heavy model is seductive in the boom years but brutal when policy or sentiment changes. The brands and retailers that are faring better today are those that diversified earlier into more markets, more passenger segments and more price tiers.

Second, inventory is strategy. Estée Lauder’s experience shows that long planning cycles, optimistic forecasts and shipment‑led sell‑in are a toxic combination in a channel where regulation, footfall and conversion can change quickly. Dynamic assortment, closer POS data sharing with retailers and truly demand‑driven replenishment are no longer “nice to have” – they are survival tools.

Third, travel retail must be integrated into – not separated from – brand building. During the boom, it was easy to treat Hainan and Seoul as volume machines for established franchises. Right now, the brands winning in airport and downtown duty free are often the same ones leading in local markets and digital – new‑generation, content‑rich, community‑driven labels that feel native to Gen Z and Gen Alpha consumers. Estée Lauder’s heavy dependence on mature heritage brands has made that reset harder.

Finally, agility in organisation matters. Estée Lauder is now simplifying regions, right-sizing headcount and promising to redeploy savings into consumer‑facing investments and innovation. The strategic logic is sound, but the delay has cost the company years of growth, billions in market value and, crucially, share of mind among travellers and local consumers who had more agile alternatives competing for their wallets.

If there is a silver lining that can be identified at all, it is that Estée Lauder’s painful reset is forcing the industry to rethink what “success” in travel retail actually looks like in the post‑daigou, post‑Hainan‑boom era. With less dependence on arbitrage, more focus on real travellers, fewer bets on one market, and more resilience built into networks. And perhaps – above all –  a willingness to admit that the old playbook is broken before the numbers do it for you.

 

Peter Marshall

Founder: trunblocked.com/Marshall Arts
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